

Revisiting Invariants

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Motivation

Previous work on [software components](#)

- as persistent (state-based) and interacting entities
- leads to the development of coalgebraic models as generalised (= parametrized by a strong monad) Mealy machines [Bar00]
- and calculi to compose components and reason compositionally about them [BO02,BO03].

... but somehow neglected the ubiquity of “business rules” in systems design.

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Clearly, most “business rules” are [invariants](#). But

- how can we calculate with invariants, in a [generic](#) way?
- and preserve them along the component assembly process?

Invariants

Definition (by Bart Jacobs)

An invariant for a coalgebra $c : X \rightarrow F(X)$ is a predicate $P \subseteq X$ which is “closed under c ”:

$$x \in P \Rightarrow c(x) \in \text{Pred}(F)(P)$$

for all $x \in X$.

Question

Is such a definition amenable to formal calculation?
(formal \equiv in a *let-the-symbols-do-the-work* style)

Modelling vs Calculating

The use of formal modelling methods often raises a kind of

Notation conflict

between

- *descriptiveness* — ie., adequacy to describe domain-specific objects and properties and build suitable models, and
- *compactness* — as required by algebraic reasoning and solution calculation.

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between

- *descriptiveness* — ie., adequacy to describe domain-specific objects and properties and build suitable models, and
- *compactness* — as required by algebraic reasoning and solution calculation.

More demanding problems entails the need for a temporary change of the working “mathematical space”, e.g.

Laplace transform

From the time-space to the s -space:

$f(t)$ is transformed into $(\mathcal{L} f)s = \int_0^\infty e^{-st} f(t) dt$

Quoting Kreyszig's book, p.242

"(...) The Laplace transformation is a method for solving differential equations (...) [which] consists of three main steps:

- 1st step. The given "hard" problem is transformed into a "simple" equation (subsidiary equation).*
- 2nd step. The subsidiary equation is solved by **purely algebraic** manipulations.*
- 3rd step. The solution of the subsidiary equation is transformed back to obtain the solution of the given problem.*

*In this way the Laplace transformation reduces the problem of solving a differential equation to an **algebraic problem**".*

An “s-space equivalent” for logical quantification

The pointfree (\mathcal{PF}) transform

ϕ	$\mathcal{PF} \phi$
$\langle \exists a :: b R a \wedge a S c \rangle$	$b(R \cdot S)c$
$\langle \forall a, b : b R a : b S a \rangle$	$R \subseteq S$
$\langle \forall a :: a R a \rangle$	$id \subseteq R$
$\langle \forall x : x R b : x S a \rangle$	$b(R \setminus S)a$
$\langle \forall c : b R c : a S c \rangle$	$a(S / R)b$
$b R a \wedge c S a$	$(b, c)\langle R, S \rangle a$
$b R a \wedge d S c$	$(b, d)(R \times S)(a, c)$
$b R a \wedge b S a$	$b(R \cap S) a$
$b R a \vee b S a$	$b(R \cup S) a$
$(f b) R (g a)$	$b(f^\circ \cdot R \cdot g)a$
TRUE	$b \top a$
FALSE	$b \perp a$

What are R , S , \perp , ...?

A transform for logic and set-theory

An old idea

$\mathcal{PF}(\text{sets, predicates}) = \text{pointfree binary relations}$

Calculus of binary relations

- 1860 - introduced by De Morgan, embryonic
- 1870 - Peirce finds interesting equational laws
- 1941 - Tarski's school
- 1980's - coreflexive models of sets (Freyd and Scedrov, Eindhoven MPC group and others)

Unifying approach

Everything is a (binary) relation

Binary Relations

Arrow notation

Arrow $B \xleftarrow{R} A$ denotes a binary relation to B (target) from A (source).

Identity of composition

id such that $R \cdot id = id \cdot R = R$

Converse

Converse of R — R° such that $a(R^\circ)b$ iff $b R a$.

Ordering

$R \subseteq S$ — the “ R is at most S ” — the obvious $R \subseteq S$ **ordering**.

Binary Relations

Pointwise meaning

$b R a$ means that pair $\langle b, a \rangle$ is in R , eg.

$$\begin{array}{ccc} 1 & \leq & 2 \\ \text{John} & \textit{IsFatherOf} & \text{Mary} \\ 3 & = (1+) & 2 \end{array}$$

Reflexive and coreflexive relations

- Reflexive relation: $id \subseteq R$
- Coreflexive relation: $R \subseteq id$

Sets

Are represented by coreflexives, eg. set $\{0, 1\}$ is



Algebraic manipulation

Algebraic (“al-djabr”) rules, as **Galois connections**

$$\begin{array}{l}
 (f) \cdot R \subseteq S \equiv R \subseteq (f^\circ) \cdot S \\
 R \cdot (f^\circ) \subseteq S \equiv R \subseteq S \cdot (f) \\
 (T) \cdot R \subseteq S \equiv R \subseteq (T) \setminus S
 \end{array}$$

or **closure** rules, eg. (for Φ coreflexive),

$$(\Phi) \cdot R \subseteq S \equiv \Phi \cdot R \subseteq (\Phi) \cdot S$$

Invariants PF-transformed

Imploding the outermost \forall in Jacobs definition:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \langle \forall x :: x \in P \Rightarrow c(x) \in \text{Pred}(F)(P) \rangle \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{sets as coreflexive relations} \} \\
 & \langle \forall x :: x P x \Rightarrow (c x) \text{Pred}(F)(P) (c x) \rangle \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{PF-transform rule } (f b)R(g a) \equiv b(f^\circ \cdot R \cdot g)a \} \\
 & \langle \forall x :: x P x \Rightarrow x(c^\circ \cdot \text{Pred}(F)(P) \cdot c)x \rangle \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{drop variables (PF-transform of inclusion)} \} \\
 & P \subseteq c^\circ \cdot \text{Pred}(F)(P) \cdot c \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{introduce relator ; shunting rule} \} \\
 & c \cdot P \subseteq (F P) \cdot c \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{introduce Reynolds combinator} \} \\
 & c(F P \leftarrow P)c
 \end{aligned}$$

About Reynolds arrow

Reynolds arrow combinator is a relation on functions

$$f(R \leftarrow S)g \equiv f \cdot S \subseteq R \cdot g \quad \text{cf. diagram}$$

useful in expressing properties of functions — namely **monotonicity**

$$B \xleftarrow{f} A \text{ is monotonic} \equiv f(\leq_B \leftarrow \leq_A)f$$

polymorphism (free theorem):

$$G A \xleftarrow{f} F A \text{ is polymorphic} \equiv \langle \forall R :: f(G R \leftarrow F R)f \rangle$$

etc

Invariants as coreflexive bisimulations

Re-working the calculation backwards, and considering two coalgebras c and d and a relation R on their state spaces:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & c(FR \leftarrow R)d \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{Reynolds combinator} \} \\
 & c \cdot R \subseteq (FR) \cdot d \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{shunting rule; drop variables (PF-transform of inclusion)} \} \\
 & \langle \forall x, y :: x R y \Rightarrow x(c^\circ \cdot FR \cdot d)y \rangle \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{PF-transform rule } (f b)R(g a) \equiv b(f^\circ \cdot R \cdot g)a \} \\
 & \langle \forall x, y :: x R y \Rightarrow (c x) FR (d y) \rangle
 \end{aligned}$$

Invariants as coreflexive bisimulations

... arrive at:

Definition (by Bart Jacobs):

A bisimulation for coalgebras $c : X \rightarrow F(X)$ and $d : Y \rightarrow F(Y)$ is a relation $R \subseteq X \times Y$ which is “closed under c and d ”:

$$(x, y) \in R \Rightarrow (c(x), d(y)) \in \text{Rel}(F)(R)$$

for all $x \in X$ and $y \in Y$.

Question

Having put both *invariants* and *bisimulations* in a common setting

— as **Reynolds arrows** —

how can our *reasoning power* be enriched?

Why Reynolds arrow matters?

Useful and manageable PF-properties

For example

$$id \leftarrow id = id \quad (1)$$

$$(R \leftarrow S)^\circ = R^\circ \leftarrow S^\circ \quad (2)$$

$$R \leftarrow S \subseteq V \leftarrow U \iff R \subseteq V \wedge U \subseteq S \quad (3)$$

$$(R \leftarrow V) \cdot (S \leftarrow U) \subseteq (R \cdot S) \leftarrow (V \cdot U) \quad (4)$$

recalled from Backhouse's *"On a relation on functions"* (1990)

Why Reynolds arrow matters

Get monotony on the consequent side and thus,

$$S \leftarrow R \subseteq (S \cup V) \leftarrow R \quad (5)$$

$$\top \leftarrow S = \top \quad (6)$$

anti-monotony on the antecedent one

$$R \leftarrow \perp = \top \quad (7)$$

and two distributive laws:

$$S \leftarrow (R_1 \cup R_2) = (S \leftarrow R_1) \cap (S \leftarrow R_2) \quad (8)$$

$$(S_1 \cap S_2) \leftarrow R = (S_1 \leftarrow R) \cap (S_2 \leftarrow R) \quad (9)$$

Why Reynolds arrow matters

Ex: id is a bisimulation

$$\begin{aligned}
 & c(F \text{ id} \leftarrow \text{id})d \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{relator } F \text{ preserves the identity} \} \\
 & c(\text{id} \leftarrow \text{id})d \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ (1) \} \\
 & c(\text{id}) d \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{id } x = x \} \\
 & c = d
 \end{aligned}$$

Why Reynolds arrow matters

Ex: the converse of a bisimulation is a bisimulation

$$\begin{aligned}
 & c(F R \leftarrow R)d \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{converse} \} \\
 & d(F R \leftarrow R)^\circ c \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ (2) \} \\
 & d((F R)^\circ \leftarrow R^\circ)c \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{relator } F \} \\
 & d(F(R^\circ) \leftarrow R^\circ)c
 \end{aligned}$$

Why Reynolds arrow matters

Ex: bisimulations are closed under union

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}
 & (F R_1 \leftarrow R_1) \cap (F R_2 \leftarrow R_2) \\
 \subseteq & \quad \{ \text{(5) (twice) ; monotonicity of meet} \} \\
 & ((F R_1 \cup F R_2) \leftarrow R_1) \cap ((F R_1 \cup F R_2) \leftarrow R_2) \\
 = & \quad \{ \text{(8)} \} \\
 & (F R_1 \cup F R_2) \leftarrow (R_1 \cup R_2) \\
 = & \quad \{ \text{relators} \} \\
 & F(R_1 \cup R_2) \leftarrow (R_1 \cup R_2)
 \end{aligned}$$

Why Reynolds arrow matters

Ex: behavioural equivalence is a bisimulation

$$uRv \equiv \llbracket c \rrbracket u = \llbracket d \rrbracket v \quad R \text{ is a bisimulation}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & c(F(\llbracket c \rrbracket^\circ \cdot \llbracket d \rrbracket) \leftarrow \llbracket c \rrbracket^\circ \cdot \llbracket d \rrbracket) d \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{definition} \} \\
 & \llbracket c \rrbracket^\circ \cdot \llbracket d \rrbracket \subseteq c^\circ \cdot F(\llbracket c \rrbracket^\circ \cdot \llbracket d \rrbracket) \cdot d \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{relators} \} \\
 & \llbracket c \rrbracket^\circ \cdot \llbracket d \rrbracket \subseteq c^\circ \cdot F \llbracket c \rrbracket^\circ \cdot F \llbracket d \rrbracket \cdot d \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{converse} \} \\
 & \llbracket c \rrbracket^\circ \cdot \llbracket d \rrbracket \subseteq (F \llbracket c \rrbracket \cdot c)^\circ \cdot F \llbracket d \rrbracket \cdot d
 \end{aligned}$$

Why Reynolds arrow matters

Ex: behavioural equivalence is a bisimulation

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \llbracket c \rrbracket^\circ \cdot \llbracket d \rrbracket \subseteq (F \llbracket c \rrbracket \cdot c)^\circ \cdot F \llbracket d \rrbracket \cdot d \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{universal property of coinductive extension} \} \\
 & \llbracket c \rrbracket^\circ \cdot \llbracket d \rrbracket \subseteq (\omega \cdot \llbracket c \rrbracket)^\circ \cdot \omega \cdot \llbracket d \rrbracket \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{converse} \} \\
 & \llbracket c \rrbracket^\circ \cdot \llbracket d \rrbracket \subseteq \llbracket c \rrbracket^\circ \cdot \omega^\circ \cdot \omega \cdot \llbracket d \rrbracket \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{Lambek (final coalgebra is an isomorphism)} \} \\
 & \text{true}
 \end{aligned}$$

Why Reynolds arrow matters

... too simple and obvious, even *without* Reynolds arrow in the play. But, consider now the equivalence between Jacobs and Aczel-Mendler's definition of *bisimulation*


Definition (by Aczel & Mendler)

Given two coalgebras $c : X \rightarrow F(X)$ and $d : Y \rightarrow F(Y)$ an F -bisimulation is a relation $R \subseteq X \times Y$ which can be extended to a coalgebra ρ such that projections π_1 and π_2 lift to F -comorphisms, as expressed by

$$\begin{array}{ccccc}
 & & R & & \\
 & \swarrow \pi_1 & \downarrow \rho & \searrow \pi_2 & \\
 X & & & & Y \\
 \downarrow c & & \downarrow F\rho & & \downarrow d \\
 FX & \swarrow F\pi_1 & FR & \searrow F\pi_2 & FY
 \end{array}$$

Jacobs \equiv Aczel & Mendler

$$\begin{aligned}
& c(F R \leftarrow R)d \\
\equiv & \quad \{ \text{tabulate } R = \pi_1 \cdot \pi_2^\circ \} \\
& c(F(\pi_1 \cdot \pi_2^\circ) \leftarrow (\pi_1 \cdot \pi_2^\circ))d \\
\equiv & \quad \{ \text{relator commutes with composition and converse} \} \\
& c(((F \pi_1) \cdot (F \pi_2)^\circ) \leftarrow (\pi_1 \cdot \pi_2^\circ))d \\
\equiv & \quad \{ \text{fusion [CIC'06] law} \} \\
& c((F \pi_1 \leftarrow \pi_1) \cdot ((F \pi_2)^\circ \leftarrow \pi_2^\circ))d \\
\equiv & \quad \{ (2) \} \\
& c((F \pi_1 \leftarrow \pi_1) \cdot (F \pi_2 \leftarrow \pi_2)^\circ)d \\
\equiv & \quad \{ \text{go pointwise (composition)} \} \\
& \langle \exists a :: c(F \pi_1 \leftarrow \pi_1)a \wedge d(F \pi_2 \leftarrow \pi_2)a \rangle
\end{aligned}$$



Why Reynolds arrow matters

Meaning of $\langle \exists a :: c(F \pi_1 \leftarrow \pi_1)a \wedge d(F \pi_2 \leftarrow \pi_2)a \rangle :$

there exists a coalgebra a whose carrier is the “graph” of bisimulation R and which is such that projections π_1 and π_2 lift to the corresponding coalgebra morphisms.

Comments:

- One-slide-long proofs are easier to grasp — for a (longer) bi-implication proof of the above see Backhouse & Hoogendijk’s paper on *dialgebras* (1999)
- Rule $(r \cdot s^\circ) \leftarrow (f \cdot g^\circ) = (r \leftarrow f) \cdot (s \leftarrow g)^\circ$ does most of the work — its proof is an example of generic, stepwise PF-reasoning [CIC’06, paper to appear]

Why Reynolds arrow matters

Ex: **coalgebra morphisms entail bisimulation**

Immediate, since inclusion of functions is equality:

$$c(F h \leftarrow h)d \equiv c \cdot h = (F h) \cdot d \quad (10)$$

However, in the Aczel & Mendler setting becomes:

Let $h : d \leftarrow c$ a coalgebra morphism and conjecture $\gamma : F h \leftarrow h$

$$\gamma = F(\pi_2)^\circ \cdot d \cdot \pi_2 \quad (11)$$

Now prove the diagram commutes: i.e., both π_1 and π_2 are coalgebra morphisms, i.e.,

$$F \pi_1 \cdot \gamma = c \cdot \pi_1 \quad F \pi_2 \cdot \gamma = d \cdot \pi_2 \quad (12)$$

Clearly, π_2 is a coalgebra *isomorphism*. Then, prove that π_1 is also a coalgebra morphism, i.e.,

$$c \cdot \pi_1 = F \pi_1 \cdot \gamma \quad (13)$$

Why Reynolds arrow matters

$$\begin{aligned}
 c \cdot \pi_1 &= F \pi_1 \cdot \gamma \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{conjecture on } \gamma; \text{ functors} \} \\
 c \cdot \pi_1 &= F(\pi_1 \cdot (\pi_2)^\circ) \cdot d \cdot \pi_2 \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ h = \pi_1 \cdot (\pi_2)^\circ \} \\
 c \cdot \pi_1 &= F h \cdot d \cdot \pi_2 \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ h \text{ morphism} \} \\
 c \cdot \pi_1 &= c \cdot h \cdot \pi_2 \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \pi_2 \text{ iso, } h = \pi_1 \cdot (\pi_2)^\circ \} \\
 c \cdot \pi_1 &= c \cdot \pi_1
 \end{aligned}$$

Why Reynolds arrow matters

Now the converse direction: if h is a function st the diagram commutes, h is a coalgebra morphism.

$$\begin{aligned}
 & c \cdot h = F h \cdot d \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ h = \pi_1 \cdot (\pi_2)^\circ, \text{ functors} \} \\
 & c \cdot \pi_1 \cdot (\pi_2)^\circ = F \pi_1 \cdot F (\pi_2)^\circ \cdot d \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{hyp: (12)} \} \\
 & F \pi_1 \cdot \gamma \cdot (\pi_2)^\circ = F \pi_1 \cdot F (\pi_2)^\circ \cdot d \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \gamma \text{ definition and } \pi_2 \text{ is iso} \} \\
 & F \pi_1 \cdot \gamma = F \pi_1 \cdot \gamma
 \end{aligned}$$

Invariants

Invariants are coreflexive bisimulations

$$c(F \Phi \leftarrow \Phi)c$$

Get for free:

- id (everywhere true predicate) is largest invariant
- \perp (everywhere false) is the least one
- Invariants are closed by disjunction (ie. union), ...

Modalities

Invariants bring about *modalities*:

$$\begin{aligned}
 c(F\Phi \leftarrow \Phi)c &\equiv c \cdot \Phi \subseteq F\Phi \cdot c \\
 &\equiv \{ \text{shunting rule} \} \\
 &\quad \Phi \subseteq \underbrace{c^\circ \cdot (F\Phi) \cdot c}_{\bigcirc_c \Phi}
 \end{aligned}$$

since we define the “next time X holds” modal operator as

$$\bigcirc_c X \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} c^\circ \cdot (FX) \cdot c$$

$$\Phi \text{ invariant} \equiv \Phi \subseteq \bigcirc \Phi$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 c(F\Phi \leftarrow \Phi)c &\equiv c \cdot \Phi \subseteq F\Phi \cdot c \\
 &\equiv \Phi \subseteq c^\circ \cdot F\Phi \cdot c \\
 &\equiv \Phi \subseteq \bigcirc \Phi
 \end{aligned}$$


Modalities

In PF-refactoring of *database theory* [Oli06] has derived Galois connection

$$\pi_{g,f} R \subseteq S \equiv R \subseteq g^\circ \cdot S \cdot f \quad (14)$$

in order to get (for free) properties of lower adjoint $\pi_{g,f}$.

Interesting enough, an instance of such a connection

$$\pi_c \Phi \subseteq \Psi \equiv \Phi \subseteq \circ_c \Psi \quad (15)$$


(within coreflexives) can be re-used to obtain (again for free) properties — now — of the upper adjoint \circ_c :

Modalities

As an upper adjoint in a Galois connection,

- \circ_c is **monotonic** — thus simple proofs such as

Φ is an invariant

$$\equiv \{ \text{PF-definition of invariant} \}$$

$$\Phi \subseteq \circ_c \Phi$$

$$\Rightarrow \{ \text{monotonicity} \}$$

$$\circ_c \Phi \subseteq \circ_c(\circ_c \Phi)$$

$$\equiv \{ \text{PF-definition of invariant} \}$$

$\circ_c \Phi$ is an invariant

- \circ_c **distributes** over conjunction, that is PF-equality

$$\circ_c(\Phi \cdot \Psi) = (\circ_c \Phi) \cdot (\circ_c \Psi)$$

holds, etc

Modalities

Further modal operators, for instance $\Box\Psi$ — *henceforth* Ψ — usually defined as *the largest invariant at most* Ψ :

$$\Box\Psi = \langle \bigcup \Phi :: \Phi \subseteq \Psi \cap \bigcirc_c \Phi \rangle$$

which shrinks to a greatest (post)fix-point

$$\Box\Psi = \langle \nu \Phi :: \Psi \cdot \bigcirc_c \Phi \rangle$$

where meet (of coreflexives) is replaced by composition, as this paves the way to agile reasoning

Modalities

Ex: $\Box\Phi = \Phi \equiv \Phi \text{ inv}$

(cf, [Jacobs,06] Lemma 4.2.6, pg 109)

$\Box\Phi \subseteq \Phi$ is obvious from the definition, but

$\Phi \text{ inv}$

$\equiv \quad \{ \text{just proved} \}$

$\Phi \subseteq \bigcirc\Phi$

$\equiv \quad \{ \Phi \cdot \text{monotonic; composition of coreflexives is involutive} \}$

$\Phi \subseteq \Phi \cdot \bigcirc\Phi$

$\Rightarrow \quad \{ \text{greatest fixed point induction: } x \leq fx \Rightarrow x \leq \nu f \}$

$\Phi \subseteq \Box\Phi$

Modalities

$$\Phi \subseteq \Box\Phi$$

$$\Rightarrow \quad \{ \Box\Phi \subseteq f(\Box\Phi) \text{ for } fx = \Phi \cdot \circ x \text{ and gfp induction: } \nu_f \leq f\nu_f \}$$

$$\Phi \subseteq \Phi \cdot \circ(\Box\Phi)$$

$$\equiv \quad \{ \text{shunting of coreflexives} \}$$

$$\Phi \subseteq \circ(\Box\Phi)$$

$$\Rightarrow \quad \{ \text{monotony; } \Box\Phi \subseteq \Phi \}$$

$$\Phi \subseteq \circ\Phi$$

$$\equiv \quad \{ \text{definition} \}$$

$$\Phi \text{ inv}$$

Modalities


Ex: $\Box\Phi \subseteq \Box\Box\Phi$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \Box\Phi \subseteq \Box\Box\Phi \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{definition} \} \\
 & \Box\Phi \subseteq (\nu X :: \Box\Phi \cdot \bigcirc X) \\
 \Leftarrow & \quad \{ \text{gfp induction} \} \\
 & \Box\Phi \subseteq \Box\Phi \cdot \bigcirc(\Box\Phi) \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \Box\Phi \cdot \Phi = \Box\Phi \text{ because } \cap \text{ is composition and } \Box\Phi \subseteq \Phi \} \\
 & \Box\Phi \subseteq \Box\Phi \cdot \Phi \cdot \bigcirc(\Box\Phi) \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{shunting of coreflexives and } \nu_f \leq f\nu_f \} \\
 & \Box\Phi \subseteq \Phi \cdot \bigcirc(\Box\Phi) \equiv \text{true}
 \end{aligned}$$

Recall: Components as coalgebras

A (generic) component p with input interface I and output interface O

$$p : O \leftarrow I$$



is a pair

$$\langle u_p \in U_p, \bar{a}_p : B(U_p \times O)^I \leftarrow U_p \rangle$$

where

- point u_p is the 'initial' or 'seed' state.
- B is an arbitrary **strong** monad.

Recall: Components as coalgebras

The semantics of p is the behaviour produced by starting at initial state u_p and **unfolding** over coalgebra \bar{a}_p :

$$\llbracket p \rrbracket = \llbracket \bar{a}_p \rrbracket u_p$$

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 B(\nu \times O)' & \xleftarrow{\omega} & \nu \\
 \uparrow & & \uparrow \llbracket \bar{a}_p \rrbracket \\
 B(\llbracket \bar{a}_p \rrbracket \times O)' & & U_p \\
 & \xleftarrow{\bar{a}_p} &
 \end{array}$$

That is, an action will not simply produce an output and a continuation state, but a **B**-structure of such pairs.

Monad **B**'s **unit** (η) and **multiplication** (μ) provide, respectively, a value embedding and a 'flatten' operation to unravel nested behavioural annotations.


Invariants as types

- Each (elementary) component is an aggregation of **methods** over a shared state space, typically restricted by an (often complex) invariant,
- whose underlying mathematical space can be organised as a category whose
 - **objects** are **coreflexives** (representing invariants)
 - **arrows**

$$f : \Psi \longleftarrow \Phi \equiv f(\Psi \longleftarrow \Phi)f \equiv f \cdot \Phi \subseteq \Psi \cdot f$$

- Current work: on the **structure** of this category [paper in preparation]

Combinators preserve invariants

Ex: Pipeline $p; q$:

$$a_{p;q} : B(U_p \times U_q \times O) \longleftarrow U_p \times U_q \times I$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 a_{p;q} &= U_p \times U_q \times I \xrightarrow{\cong} U_p \times I \times U_q \xrightarrow{a_p \times \text{id}} B(U_p \times K) \times U_q \\
 &\xrightarrow{\tau_r} B(U_p \times K \times U_q) \xrightarrow{\cong} B(U_p \times (U_q \times K)) \\
 &\xrightarrow{B(\text{id} \times a_q)} B(U_p \times B(U_q \times O)) \xrightarrow{B\tau_l} BB(U_p \times (U_q \times O)) \\
 &\xrightarrow{\cong} BB(U_p \times U_q \times O) \xrightarrow{\mu} B(U_p \times U_q \times O)
 \end{aligned}$$

Combinators preserve invariants

Invariants are preserved \equiv the following is a well-typed arrow:

$$\begin{aligned}
 a_{p;q} &= \Phi_p \times \Phi_q \times I \xrightarrow{\cong} \Phi_p \times I \times \Phi_q \xrightarrow{a_p \times \text{id}} B(\Phi_p \times K) \times \Phi_q \\
 &\xrightarrow{\tau_r} B(\Phi_p \times K \times \Phi_q) \xrightarrow{\cong} B(\Phi_p \times (\Phi_q \times K)) \\
 &\xrightarrow{B(\text{id} \times a_q)} B(\Phi_p \times B(U_q \times O)) \xrightarrow{B\tau_l} BB(\Phi_p \times (\Phi_q \times O)) \\
 &\xrightarrow{\cong} BB(\Phi_p \times \Phi_q \times O) \xrightarrow{\mu} B(\Phi_p \times \Phi_q \times O)
 \end{aligned}$$

Combinators preserve invariants

which is an immediate consequence of the (generic) way in which combinators are defined:

- **natural transformations** are trivial: each **polymorphic** construction α verifies $\alpha(S \leftarrow R)\alpha$ for all R, S .
- **functorial** arrows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & F f(F \Phi \leftarrow F \Psi)F f \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{Reynolds combinator} \} \\
 & F f \cdot F \Psi \subseteq F \Phi \cdot F f \\
 \equiv & \quad \{ \text{functors} \} \\
 & F(f \cdot \Phi) \subseteq F(\Psi \cdot f) \\
 \Leftarrow & \quad \{ \text{monotonicity} \} \\
 & f(\Phi \leftarrow \Psi)f
 \end{aligned}$$

- component **actions** which, by hypothesis, preserve their own invariants

Summary

Such conceptual tools are applicable at different design levels:

- **micro**: synthesising component invariants from the individual methods over complex data structures
(cf, Necco & Oliveira & Visser, *Extended Static Checking by Rewriting Pointfree Relations*, 2007
and Oliveira, *Reinvigorating pen-and-paper proofs in VDM: the pointfree approach*, 2006)
- **macro**: invariant preservation in the component calculus.
- **architectural**: global (non structural) "business rules" over components' aggregations

Summary

- Rôle of PF-patterns: clear-cut expression of complex logic structures once expressed in less symbols
- Stress the syntactic aspect of formal reasoning, a kind of "let-the-symbols-do-the-work" style of calculation, often neglected by too much emphasis on domain-specific, semantic concerns.
- Rôle of PF-patterns: much easier to spot synergies among different theories

In particular, a synergy between a relational construct, traditionally employed in explaining and reasoning about parametric polymorphism, and the coalgebraic approach to bisimulations and invariants emerged.